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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. 
 
On September 12, 1995, Michael Kirschbaum fell down a 
stairway in the GSB Office Building, located in Bala 
Cynwyd, Pennsylvania. Kirschbaum sustained serious 
injuries as a result of the fall and, seeking compensation 
for these injuries, sued the building's owner , WRGSB 
Associates (WRGSB). In turn, WRGSB filed a third-party 
complaint against Insignia Commercial Gr oup (Insignia), 
the building manager with whom WRGSB had contracted to 
manage, maintain and repair the building. Both parties 
settled with Kirschbaum, but retained their r espective 
rights of contribution and indemnity. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
apportioned liability equally between the two parties and 
required each party to pay half of the settlement amount. 
The parties appeal, each seeking to have the other bear the 
full cost of settlement. We affirm. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
Michael Kirschbaum maintained a medical practice in the 
GSB Building, where he had been a tenant since 1988. On 
average, Kirschbaum worked six days a week, often arriving 
at the building's parking garage before 7:00 a.m., when the 
building opened. Because the building was still closed at 
the time of Kirschbaum's arrival, he would walk up aflight 
of stairs that led to a door to the building, a key to which 
he had been supplied by Insignia, the building manager. 
This flight consisted of 15 steps, and it was walled on both 
sides. A wall-mounted handrail ran up one of these walls, 
but, at the bottom of the stairwell, the handrail had become 
detached from the wall and was resting on the stairs. While 
Kirschbaum was aware of the broken handrail (it had been 
broken ever since he became a tenant in the GSB building), 
he nonetheless continued to use the stairs. 
 
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on September 12, 1995, 
Kirschbaum arrived at the building and parked in the lower 
parking garage. As he was climbing the stairs leading to the 
building, Kirschbaum stumbled while attempting to place 
his foot on the fifth step. Because the stairway's handrail 
was broken and resting on the stairs at the fifth step, 
Kirschbaum was unable to catch himself, and he fell to the 
bottom of the stairs. As a result of the fall, Kirschbaum 
suffered not only from fractur ed bones, but also from a 
chronic infection of the right leg which may r equire the 
amputation of that leg. See Kirschbaum v. WRGSB 
Associates, No. 97-5532, slip op. at 2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. filed 
Dec. 14, 1999). 
 
Kirschbaum sued WRGSB, the owner of the building, and 
the district court properly asserted jurisdiction over the 
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1332. Kirschbaum alleged 
that he tripped on a step (also known as a "riser") that was 
5/8 of an inch taller than the other steps in the stairwell, 
and further stated that he was subsequently unable to 
arrest his fall due to the broken handrail. As such, 
Kirschbaum alleged two causes of his fall: (1) the riser 
height discrepancy and (2) the broken handrail. 
 
Because WRGSB had hired Insignia to not only manage, 
but also maintain and repair, the building--including the 
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stairwell in which Kirschbaum was injured--WRGSB 
brought a third-party action against Insignia, seeking 
contribution or indemnification. The district court exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction over Insignia pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1367. WRGSB maintained that it r elied on Insignia 
to manage and maintain the GSB building, and that 
Insignia was paid handsomely to do so. WRGSB further 
stated that it did not have any employees on site because 
Insignia provided several on-site management and 
engineering personnel pursuant to the property 
management agreement. As a result, WRGSB maintained 
that Insignia ought to be solely responsible for the injuries 
Kirschbaum sustained as a result of the riser height 
discrepancy and broken handrail, both of which WRGSB 
believed that Insignia was responsible for corr ecting under 
the property management agreement. 
 
All of Kirschbaum's claims were settled on September 14, 
1998, with WRGSB and Insignia each contributing half of 
the $1,750,000 settlement amount, but retaining their 
respective rights of indemnity and contribution. 
Subsequently, both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment, seeking to have the other bear the full cost of 
settlement. The parties based their motions for summary 
judgment on contradictory interpretations of the property 
management agreement: WRGSB argued that, under the 
terms of the agreement, Insignia was wholly responsible for 
maintaining the stairwell, while Insignia contended that 
WRGSB was required, under the agreement, to purchase 
insurance and fully indemnify Insignia. 
 
Following the motions for summary judgment, the 
magistrate judge assigned to the case issued a r eport and 
recommendation which concluded that both parties were 
equally negligent in causing Kirschbaum's fall. In 
accordance with this determination, the magistrate judge 
recommended that the parties bear the cost of settlement 
equally. The district court adopted most of the magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation, but r eferred the 
apportionment of liability issue back to the magistrate 
judge for an evidentiary hearing. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, WRGSB presented the 
testimony of various Insignia employees. This testimony 
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was somewhat cumulative and can be summed up as 
generally showing that the employees believed Insignia's job 
was to repair and maintain the GSB Building. In addition 
to this testimony, Dan Grinnan, Insignia's chief engineer at 
the GSB building, testified that he attempted to r e-weld the 
broken brackets holding the handrail to the wall before 
Kirschbaum's accident, knew those repairs had failed and 
was aware that the handrail was still br oken on the day of 
the accident. Nonetheless, Grinnan never notified WRGSB 
or Kirschbaum that the handrail was broken. Insignia 
countered by calling Charles Goedken, a civil engineer, as 
its expert witness. He testified that ther e was a 5/8 inch 
discrepancy in one of the stairway's risers, that such a 
discrepancy did not conform to generally accepted 
engineering standards and that such a discr epancy created 
a foreseeable risk of falling. 
 
Following the hearing, the magistrate judge again found 
that WRGSB and Insignia were equally liable for the 
settlement cost. The magistrate judge held that WRGSB 
had a duty to discover and remedy the riser height 
discrepancy, and that Insignia had a separate duty to 
repair the broken handrail. Accordingly, the magistrate 
judge ordered them each to pay one half of the settlement 
amount. WRGSB appeals, and Insignia cross-appeals. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 636(c)(3) & 1291. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Not surprisingly, WRGSB believes that Insignia is solely 
responsible for Kirschbaum's injuries because the property 
management agreement required Insignia to take 
responsibility for the physical condition of all aspects of the 
staircase, including the handrail and the stair risers. 
Insignia cross-appeals, arguing that WRGSB should pay the 
entire settlement amount because: (1) the agr eement 
required WRGSB to provide primary insurance coverage for 
Insignia; (2) WRGSB should not have been able to seek 
contribution or indemnity from Insignia withoutfirst 
establishing that WRGSB was liable to Kirschbaum for his 
injuries; and (3) Kirschbaum assumed the risk of injury 
presented by the handrail. 
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Because this is a diversity case, we must first determine 
the substantive state law that is to govern our decision. In 
making this determination, we first look to the conflict of 
laws rules of the forum state, Pennsylvania. See 
Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A. v. Clover, 195 F.3d 161, 165 
(3d. Cir. 1999). For substantive tort law issues, 
Pennsylvania uses a combination of the "gover nment 
interest" and "significant relationship" approaches to 
conflict of laws analysis. Under this analysis,"a court must 
evaluate `the extent to which one state rather than another 
has demonstrated, by reason of its policies and their 
connection and relevance to the matter in dispute, a 
priority of interest in the application of its rule of law.' " See 
Troxel v. A.I. duPont Inst., 636 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1994). Neither party disputes that Pennsylvania law 
applies to the tort aspects of this case, and our r eview of 
the facts confirms that the parties ar e correct: this case 
involves an accident in Pennsylvania on a stairwell that is 
subject to Pennsylvania building codes and r egulations. As 
such, Pennsylvania has a priority interest in the application 
of its tort law to this cause. However, because the property 
management agreement so specifies, see  Agmt. at S 7.3, 
Illinois' substantive law of contracts applies to 
interpretation of the agreement. See Kruzits v. Okuma 
Mach. Tool, Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(Pennsylvania law generally respects parties' choice of law). 
 
A. WRGSB's Appeal 
 
Before reaching WRGSB's main argument, we review 
three inadequately supported claims that WRGSB raises in 
the footnotes of its opening brief. These ar guments are: (1) 
that the magistrate judge erred in allowing Insignia to call 
Goedken as its expert witness because "Insignia never 
identified Goedken as its expert witness as r equired by the 
Court's pre-trial rulings . . . ," see  Appellant's Br. at 18 n.1; 
(2) that the magistrate judge erred in deter mining that 
WRGSB was a "possessor" of the premises at the time of 
the accident, see id. at 45 n.11;1  and (3) that the magistrate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We recognize that WRGSB develops this argument more fully in its 
response to Insignia's cross-appeal. However, because the argument 
could have been raised as an issue for review in WRGSB's opening brief 
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judge erred in concluding that the riser height discrepancy 
constituted a structural defect instead of being a 
consequence of normal wear and tear, see id. at 47 n.13. 
WRGSB has not presented any of these holdings as a basis 
for its appeal, and WRGSB does not mention these 
arguments in its statement of the issues for r eview, as 
required by Rule 28(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See Appellant's Br. at 3-4. We therefore will not 
reach any of these arguments. See T ravitz v. Northeast 
Department ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 
711 (3d Cir. 1994). But, even if we wer e to reach WRGSB's 
arguments, we could not decide them on their merits since 
they are poorly briefed and deserve mor e development than 
passing mention in a footnote for us take them seriously. 
As a result, we will not examine whether the magistrate 
judge erred in allowing Insignia to call Goedken as its 
expert witness. Further, we accept the magistrate judge's 
finding that WRGSB "possessed" the building at the time of 
the accident and that the riser height discr epancy 
constituted a structural defect. 
 
WRGSB's remaining arguments can all be r educed to one 
claim: that Insignia should be responsible for the entire 
settlement amount because the property management 
agreement obligated Insignia to discover and correct defects 
in both the stair risers and the handrail. Both parties agree 
that Insignia was solely responsible for r epairing the 
defective handrail.2 Ther efore, our discussion focuses 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
--which would have required that WRGSB include the issue in its 
statement of issues for review and fully develop an argument in the 
argument portion of its brief--we will not address it. See FDIC v. Deglau, 
207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (issues not raised in opening brief on 
appeal are waived). However, even if we were to entertain WRGSB's 
appeal of the magistrate's factual determination, we would do so under 
a clearly erroneous standard of review. See A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. 
Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1999). And, 
contrary to WRGSB's contention, we have found nothing in the record to 
indicate that the magistrate committed clear err or in determining that 
WRGSB was a "possessor" of the stairwell in which Kirchbaum was 
injured at the time of the accident. 
 
2. Insignia stipulated to its responsibility for maintaining and repairing 
the handrail in the district court, see Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Associates, 
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primarily on which party must accept responsibility for the 
injuries arising out of the riser height discr epancy. 
 
As owner of the GSB building, WRGSB is charged with 
the following duty: 
 
       A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical 
       harm caused to his invitees3 by a condition on the land 
       if, but only if, he: 
 
       (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care 
       would discover the condition and should realize 
       that it involves an unreasonable risk of har m to 
       such invitees, and 
 
       (b) should expect that they will not discover or 
       realize the danger, or will fail to pr otect 
       themselves against it, and 
 
       (c) fails to exercise reasonable car e to protect them 
       against the danger. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 343 (adopted by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 
A.2d 120, 123 (1983)) (footnote added). Thus, WRGSB is 
obligated to discover and repair the riser height discrepancy 
that caused Kirschbaum's fall if, by the exer cise of 
reasonable care, WRGSB is capable of discovering the 
defect, and WRGSB should expect that Kirschbaum would 
not discover the defect himself. 
 
The magistrate judge determined that WRGSB met these 
requirements, and WRGSB does not dispute this finding 
except to argue that the riser height discr epancy is a trivial 
defect--an argument that is related to WRGSB's ability to 
discover the riser height discrepancy. In support, WRGSB 
cites several older Pennsylvania cases where approximately 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
No. 97-5532, slip op. at 10, P 36 (E.D. Pa.filed Dec. 14, 1999), and 
admits in its reply brief that it "has long since accepted responsibility" 
for this liability. Appellee's Br. at 25. As discussed below, however, 
Insignia does not believe that it ought to pay for any liability arising 
out 
of its failure to repair the handrail because it believes that, under the 
agreement, WRGSB's insurance should cover the liability. 
 
3. The parties do not dispute that Kirschbaum was an invitee on 
WRGSB's premises. 
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1.5 inch sidewalk and roadway discrepancies were found to 
be trivial. See, e.g., Bosack v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 189 
A.2d 877 (Pa. 1962); German v. City of Mckeesport, 8 A.2d 
437 (Pa. Super. 1939). While the riser defect here was only 
5/8 inch, it occurred on a stair riser, a place where the 
defect is likely to be far less obvious than on aflat surface 
such as a road (and thus more difficult to protect against). 
Relatedly, discrepancies of this kind ar e far more common 
(and therefore foreseeable) on a sidewalk than on a flight of 
stairs. Indeed, Insignia's expert witness--whom the district 
court found more credible than WRGSB's expert witness-- 
testified that a 5/8 inch discrepancy cr eated a foreseeable 
risk of falling. As such, the district court did not err in 
determining that WRGSB was requir ed to discover and 
remedy the riser height discrepancy. 
 
While WRGSB is thus charged with the duty to discover 
and repair the riser height discrepancy, WRGSB argues 
that its relationship to Insignia is such that Insignia is 
primarily liable to Kirschbaum for the injury he suf fered as 
a result of the riser height discrepancy. As a result, WRGSB 
believes that it is entitled to indemnification fr om Insignia, 
a right that "enures to a person who, without active fault 
on his own part, has been compelled, by reason of some 
legal obligation, to pay damages occasioned by the initial 
negligence of another, and for which he himself is only 
secondarily liable." Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 
368, 370 (Pa. 1951). WRGSB maintains that it is only 
secondarily liable--and Insignia primarily liable--for the 
damage to Kirschbaum because the agreement between 
itself and Insignia obligated Insignia to corr ect not just the 
broken handrail, but the riser height discr epancy as well. 
 
Accordingly, we must look to the agreement between 
WRGSB and Insignia in order to determine which party 
assumed the primary obligation for discovering and 
correcting the riser height discrepancy. As noted, we 
interpret the contract in accordance with standards 
dictated by Illinois law. Under Illinois law, a contract's 
express provisions govern when the contract is 
unambiguous. See Wright v. Chicago T itle Ins. Co., 554 
N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). If a contract's language 
cannot be interpreted in more than one way, "[a] court 
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must construe the meaning of [the] contract by looking at 
words used and cannot interpret the contract in a way 
contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of these words." 
J.M. Beals Enterprises, Inc. v. Industrial Har d Chrome, Ltd., 
551 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1990). "Unless the contract clearly 
specifies its own meanings, the court must interpr et the 
words or language of the contract with their common and 
generally accepted meanings." Id. at 342-43. Further, "the 
court must place the meanings of words within the context 
of the contract as a whole." Id. at 343. 
 
On appeal, WRGSB bases its argument primarily on S 2.4 
of the agreement, which reads in r elevant part: 
 
       [Insignia] shall . . . maintain the buildings, 
       appurtenances and common areas of the [GSB 
       Building] in good condition according to local 
       standards for comparable properties in the immediate 
       market area surrounding the Property, and, in any 
       event, in accordance with the standards and conditions 
       specified by [WRGSB Associates] from time to time. 
       Maintenance and repair items shall include, but shall 
       not be limited to, interior and exterior janitorial 
       services, exterior grounds and landscaping services, 
       repairs and alterations to existing impr ovements, 
       plumbing, parking areas, electrical systems[,] painting, 
       carpentry, maintenance and repair of mechanical 
       systems and such other maintenance and r epair work 
       as is reasonably necessary. 
 
Appx. at 233 (emphasis added). WRGSB also cites two 
other sections of the agreement as evidence of Insignia's 
alleged obligation to correct the riser height discrepancy. 
Section 2.9 of the agreement states that Insignia must use 
due care in the selection and supervision of its on-site 
personnel. See Appx. at 237. In addition,S 2.13 of the 
agreement requires Insignia to use its best efforts to ensure 
that the GSB Building is kept in compliance with applicable 
building codes. See Appx. at 240. WRGSB ar gues that these 
contract provisions clearly transfer to Insignia the building 
owner's duty to discover and remedy all hazar dous 
conditions on the premises. 
 
As an initial matter, WRGSB's reliance on sections 2.9 
(requiring due care in the selection of on-site personnel) 
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and 2.13 (requiring compliance with applicable laws and 
building codes) is misplaced. WRGSB has simply failed to 
produce any evidence that Kirschbaum's accident is due to 
Insignia's negligently hiring on-site personnel. Neither has 
WRGSB shown that Kirschbaum's accident resulted from 
Insignia's failure to maintain the GSB building in 
accordance with applicable building codes. Consequently, 
neither S 2.9 nor S 2.13 of the agr eement aids WRGSB's 
argument. 
 
We also disagree with WRGSB's reliance on S 2.4 of the 
agreement, for WRGSB appears to confuse Insignia's 
obligation to maintain and repair the building with an 
obligation to discover structural defects, such as the riser 
height discrepancy. That the agreement does not require 
Insignia to discover latent structural defects is apparent 
from the language of S 2.4, which r epeatedly emphasizes 
Insignia's duty to undertake "maintenance" and"repairs." 
The two bases of liability at issue in this case--the defective 
handrail and the riser height discrepancy--pr ovide a perfect 
example of how "maintenance" and "r epairs" should be 
interpreted: fixing a defective handrail is clearly an act of 
maintenance and repair, while discovering and mending a 
riser that has likely been defective since the building was 
constructed is not. 
 
That maintenance and repairs do not include the 
obligation to discover latent structural defects is also 
supported by the meaning commonly ascribed to these 
words. "Maintenance" is defined by Webster's New World 
Dictionary 854 (2d College Ed. 1979), to include"the work 
of keeping a building . . . in a state of good r epair." "Repair" 
is defined as "to put back in good condition after damage, 
decay, etc." Id. at 1204. These definitions both point to the 
act of fixing a deteriorated part of the building, which 
though originally sound, has fallen into disr epair. The 
definitions do not contemplate fixing a part of the building 
that was originally defective. Indeed, a finding that the 
agreement required Insignia to discover the riser height 
discrepancy would necessarily include a finding that 
Insignia is not only responsible for measuring every stair 
riser in the GSB building, but also responsible for other 
acts that are clearly not contemplated by the agreement, 
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such as inspecting the building's foundation. W e therefore 
conclude that the agreement failed to delegate 
unambiguously the duty to discover the riser height 
discrepancy to Insignia. 
 
WRGSB's confusion regarding the dif ference between 
ordinary maintenance and repair and thefixing of latent 
structural defects extends to WRGSB's argument that the 
magistrate judge failed to apply the law of the case when 
apportioning liability between the two parties. In its June 
28, 1999 Memorandum and Order, the district court stated 
that Insignia was obligated under its agreement with 
WRGSB to maintain the stairway and handrails. WRGSB 
argues that the magistrate judge failed to adhere to this 
determination because he found that WRGSB was 
responsible for discovering the riser height discrepancy. As 
is apparent from our discussion, however , the district 
court's finding that Insignia was responsible for 
maintaining the stairway in no way contradicts the 
magistrate judge's finding that WRGSB was r esponsible for 
discovering the riser height defect. 
 
WRGSB's argument that it cannot be held to a greater 
duty of care than Insignia fails for the same r eason. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 324A (adopted by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Allegheny 
County, 483 A.2d 1350 (Pa. 1984)) imposes a duty of 
reasonable care on parties (like Insignia) who render 
services for the protection of a third party (like 
Kirschbaum). From this, WRGSB argues that any duty of 
reasonable care it possessed by virtue of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts S 322 was delegated to Insignia by the 
agreement because Insignia assumed a duty of r easonable 
care under Restatement (Second) of T orts S 324A when it 
entered into the Agreement. WRGSB might have a valid 
argument had it delegated its duty to discover the riser 
height discrepancy to Insignia. However , WRGSB did not do 
so. Consequently, it retained the duty to inspect for and 
discover the riser height discrepancy and cannot shift 
liability for its failure to do so to Insignia. 
 
In an attempt to revise the agreement's unambiguous 
terms, WRGSB seeks to have us recognize the testimony of 
Insignia's on-site property manager, on-site chief engineer 
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and on-site engineer. WRGSB believes that this testimony 
will shed new light on what the parties truly intended when 
they entered into the agreement. However , under Illinois 
law, extrinsic evidence--such as oral testimony--is not 
permitted as a means of clarifying an unambiguous 
contract. See Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 
N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1999). Because much of WRGSB's 
proffered testimony derives fr om depositions that are such 
extrinsic evidence, we will not consider this testimony. 
 
However, even if we were to consider all of the testimony, 
it would do little to aid WRGSB's argument. Each of 
Insignia's employees stated only that Insignia was 
responsible for the inspection, maintenance and repair of 
the stairway. The testimony of Kelly Buechler , a senior legal 
assistant and assistant secretary at Insignia, as well as 
Insignia's Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 30(b)(6) designee, 
is illustrative. She testified as follows: 
 
       Q: As part of the Property Management Agr eement 
       what is it that Insignia Commercial Group 
       provided with regard to the GSB Building what did 
       they do? 
 
       A: They maintained, leased, and managed the 
       property on behalf of the owner. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Q: As part of the Insignia Commercial Gr oup's 
       management agreement with WRGSB Associates 
       was Insignia Commercial Group responsible for 
       maintaining the stairways inside the GSB 
       Building? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Q: [The Property Management Agreement] obligated 
       Insignia Commercial Group to maintain the GSB 
       Building? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       * * * 
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       Q: Such maintenance would have involved r epairing 
       any condition found of the stairwell or handrail 
       leading from the underground parking garage to 
       the GSB Building . . .? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
Appx. 651-52, 658-60. Just as with the agreement's 
express language, this testimony does not establish that 
Insignia was responsible for anything other than 
maintenance and repair. And as we have discussed, the 
duty to detect and correct latent structural defects does not 
follow from the duty to maintain and repair. As such, the 
testimony of Insignia's employees does not show that 
Insignia assumed WRGSB's common law responsibility to 
inspect for and detect latent structural defects. 
 
B. Insignia's Cross-Appeal 
 
Having disposed of WRGSB's direct appeal, we turn next 
to Insignia's cross-appeal. Even though Insignia has 
admitted its responsibility for maintaining the handrail, it 
presents three unavailing arguments in hope of shifting the 
entire cost of settlement to WRGSB: (1) that, pursuant to 
the agreement, WRGSB's insurance policy covers Insignia 
as well; (2) that WRGSB has failed to prove facts that are 
necessary to establish its right to contribution and 
indemnity from Insignia; and (3) that Kirschbaum assumed 
the risk presented by the broken handrail. 
 
1. The Agreement's Insurance Pr ovisions 
 
Insignia argues that it should not have to pay its share 
of the settlement because the agreement r equired WRGSB 
to purchase general liability insurance and to name 
Insignia as an additional insured on the policy. The 
provision on which Insignia relies states: 
 
       Owner shall carry, at its own expense, commer cial 
       general liability insurance in such amounts that owner, 
       in its sole and absolute discretion, deems necessary for 
       the protection of owner's interest in the Property, and 
       such insurance shall be deemed the primary insurance 
       on the Property. Policies of commercial general liability 
       insurance carried by owner shall include manager . .. 
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       as an additional insured party only in manager's 
       capacity as manager of the property. 
 
See Appx. 244; Agmt. S 5.1. Insignia argues that the clear 
meaning of this requirement is that WRGSB's insurance 
should cover Insignia. However, in reaching its conclusion 
Insignia ignores S 5.8 of the agr eement, which states that 
Insignia has no right to recover against WRGSB or its 
insurance carrier on any claim to the extent that the claim 
arises out of Insignia's own negligence. See Appx. at 246. 
As noted, Insignia has already admitted liability for the 
handrail--a liability that clearly arises out of Insignia's own 
negligence in failing to properly secur e the handrail. 
Therefore, the language of the agr eement makes clear that 
WRGSB's insurance does not cover Insignia for its own 
negligent failure to repair the br oken handrail. 
 
2. WRGSB's Liability to Kirschbaum 
 
Insignia next argues that WRGSB cannot now seek 
contribution or indemnity from Insignia because WRGSB 
did not prove its own liability to Kirschbaum. Contribution 
applies when a plaintiff and defendant ar e joint tortfeasors. 
See Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 
1951). Contribution comes into force when one joint 
tortfeasor has discharged a common liability or paid more 
than its share of such liability, in which case the joint 
tortfeasor is entitled to reimbursement fr om the other 
tortfeasors to the extent that its payment exceeded its own 
liability. Conversely, the right of indemnification arises 
when there is a "difference between the primary and the 
secondary liability of two persons each of whom is made 
responsible by the law to an injured party." Id. In such a 
case, the party that is secondarily liable may seek complete 
reimbursement from the party that is primarily liable for 
any damages the first-mentioned party has paid. 
 
A party pursuing claims for contribution and indemnity 
can do so only if it has established that it was itself liable 
to the plaintiff for the plaintiff 's injury. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. 
S 8324(a) (West 1998) (contribution only available among 
joint tortfeasors); 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 8322 (W est 1998) (joint 
tortfeasor is, in part, one who is liable to plaintiff); Builders 
Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 1951) 
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(indemnity may be pursued by a "person who without 
actual fault on his own has been compelled by r eason of 
some legal obligation to pay damages . . . ."). Insignia 
argues that WRGSB has not established its own liability to 
Kirschbaum, and that WRGSB may thus not seek 
contribution or indemnity from Insignia. However, while we 
think it likely that WRGSB was legally liable to Kirschbaum 
--as we have noted, WRGSB is primarily liable for its 
failure to correct the riser height discr epancy and 
secondarily liable for Insignia's failure to r epair the handrail 
--WRGSB need not prove this here. As determined above, 
both parties are equally liable to Kirschbaum, but on their 
own, distinct grounds: WRGSB's liability arises out of its 
failure to correct the riser height discr epancy and Insignia's 
liability arises out of its failure to r epair the handrail. The 
parties are thus required to pay equal shares of the 
settlement, representing their equal, but distinct, bases of 
liability to Kirschbaum. Therefore, Insignia is not entitled to 
contribution or indemnity from WRGSB. Insignia's 
argument that WRGSB must prove its liability to 
Kirschbaum thus misses the point and does nothing to 
alter the parties' obligation to each pay half of the 
settlement. 
 
3. Kirschbaum's Assumption of Risk 
 
Insignia lastly argues that it cannot be liable for its 
failure to repair the handrail because Kirschbaum was 
aware of the broken handrail and assumed the risk of any 
injury resulting from it. Under Pennsylvania law, 
assumption of risk is established by showing that the 
injured party fully appreciated the natur e of the risk it 
faced and voluntarily assumed it. See Bar nes v. American 
Tobacco Co., 161 F.2d 127, 149 (3d Cir. 1998). In addition, 
the injured party must not have had a meaningful and 
reasonable alternative path to avoid the risk. See Kaplan v. 
Exxon Corp., 126 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir . 1997). Whether a 
party assumed a risk is a question of fact that is r eviewed 
for clear error. See Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 225 (assumption of 
risk generally a question of fact); A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. 
Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. , 166 F.3d 197, 201-02 (3d Cir. 
1999) (questions of fact reviewed for clear err or). 
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Insignia argues that Kirschbaum assumed the risk of 
injury resulting from his fall because he was aware of the 
broken handrail and had used the stairwell for years in 
spite of it. We believe, however, that the magistrate judge 
correctly concluded that Kirschbaum did not fully 
appreciate the extent of the risk he faced. It is true that 
Kirschbaum was aware of the broken handrail, and thus 
knew that it would not aid him were he to trip while on the 
stairs. However, the risk presented by the broken handrail 
includes not just an appreciation of the har m likely to 
result were Kirschbaum ever to need the handrail, but also 
an appreciation of the likelihood that Kirschbaum would in 
fact have to rely on the handrail to br eak a fall. This latter 
component of the handrail's risk was not appr eciated by 
Kirschbaum: he knew that he might accidently trip when 
climbing the stairs, but was completely unawar e of the riser 
height discrepancy, which increased the likelihood of a fall 
and thus the likelihood that he would need to r ely on the 
handrail. 
 
Kirschbaum also failed to assume the risk arising out of 
his use of the stairs because he did not have a r easonable 
alternative route. While Kirschbaum could have entered the 
building from one other entrance, this entrance--like the 
entrance used by Kirschbaum--was locked when 
Kirschbaum arrived in the morning. An Insignia employee 
provided Kirschbaum with the stairwell key and directed 
him to use the stairwell. As such, the stairwell was usually 
the only way for Kirschbaum to enter the building because 
he arrived at work before other building entrances opened. 
Consequently, Kirschbaum had no other reasonable route 
into the building, and he did not assume the risk pr esented 
by the broken handrail. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district 
court is Affirmed. 
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